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On December 1, 2009, Rule 6(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure—and similar rules in other sets of Federal Rules—were substantially 
amended.  Prior to that time, these rules provided that when counting short pe-
riods of time (less than eleven days), one did not count weekends or holidays.  
Now, these rules follow a “days-are-days” approach in which all days count for 
purposes of counting time periods, regardless of how short. 
This brief Aside takes a wry look at the change and its authors (the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States).  It points out that the old Rule provided excellent opportunities 
for clever lawyering and suggests that the authors’ purported rationale for the 
Rule—that counting days in whole numbers, while skipping weekends and hol-
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idays, was too complicated for the average practitioner—is a bit condescending 
and probably untrue.  In a light-hearted vein, it discusses some of the old rules’ 
conundrums and how they were resolved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On December 1, 2009, Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (FRCP) changed dramatically.  Specifically, Rule 6(a)(2)—
which provided that in computing periods of time that were less than 
eleven days, one should exclude intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and 
legal holidays—was repealed.1  In its stead is a new Rule 6(a)(1), under 
which all days are counted for any time period, regardless of length.2 
In this Aside, I express my fondness for old Rule 6(a)(2) and bid 
it a fond farewell.  Former Rule 6(a)(2) was responsible for the intri-
guing conundrums and clever arguments that made me proud to be a 
lawyer.  New Rule 6(a) is a drab, ordinary provision that lacks the 
same potential for excitement.  Moreover, the replacement of old 
Rule 6(a) with new Rule 6(a) is the product of a group of people who 
thought that counting what the rest of society might call “business 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 6(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (re-
pealed 2009).  See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE 
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesandPolicies/rules/Supreme%20Court%202008/Excerpt_ST_AP.pdf 
(“[U]nder the proposed rules amendments, intermediate weekends and holidays are 
counted regardless of the length of the specified period.”).  It was not until December 
1, 2007, when a series of “Style Amendments” to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
went into effect, that Rule 6(a) was divided into numerical subdivisions.  See Memo-
randum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 25-26 ( June 2, 2006) [hereinafter Rosenthal Memorandum], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1106/Excerpt_CV_ 
Style.pdf (detailing Rule 6’s new subdivisions).  Nonetheless, for various reasons, I 
think it promotes clarity to refer to Rule 6(a)(2) as the rule for counting periods less 
than eleven days. 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1). 
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days” was too complicated a task for lawyers.3  While it was indeed too 
complicated for them, I submit that attorneys of normal intelligence 
were having no problem at all.  Indeed, they were having fun. 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Former Rule 6(a)(2) stated that, in computing any time period, 
one should “[e]xclude intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal hol-
idays when the period is less than 11 days.”4  In contrast, new Rule 
6(a)(1)(B) states that, when a period is stated in days, one should 
“count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and le-
gal holidays.”5 
The Committee has stated that the new Rule was part of a “time-
computation project” in which a “days-are-days” approach was adopted 
in all the Rules over which the Committee exercised jurisdiction.6  
Thus, for example, a similar change was made to Rule 26 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure.7 
I began to question the brilliance of those in charge of the Feder-
al Rules back in 1991 when they changed the time period associated 
with responding to a subpoena duces tecum from ten days to fourteen 
days.8  In explaining this revision, the Advisory Committee Notes 
 
3 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing 
the amendment as a “simplifying change”).  Charles Alan Wright once called this 
group—the various committees of the Judicial Conference that propose rules—the 
“grandees of the Federal Procedural Establishment.”  Charles Alan Wright, Foreword:  
The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 2 (1994).  Lacking Professor 
Wright’s stature, I will call them, collectively, the “Committee.” 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 6(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (re-
pealed 2009). 
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(B). 
6 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining 
that the Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Rules’ Advisory Committees proposed 
similar amendments and that “[t]he principal simplifying change in the amended 
time-computation rules is the adoption of a ‘days-are-days’ approach”); see also FED R. 
APP. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 2009 amendments (explaining that former 
Rule 26(a) “made computing deadlines unnecessarily complicated and led to counter-
intuitive results”); Memorandum to Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court 1 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008-Supreme%20Courtsummary.pdf (describing the pro-
posed amendments to the various federal rules and noting that they are meant to “re-
place the inconsistent and often unclear approach of the existing rules”). 
7 The current Rule now requires that “[w]hen the period is stated in days,” one 
should “count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holi-
days.”  FED. R. APP. P. 26(a)(2).   
8 See Memorandum from Hon. John F. Grady, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
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stated that “[t]he 10-day period for response to a subpoena is ex-
tended to 14 days to avoid the complex calculations associated with 
short time periods under Rule 6 and to allow a bit more time for such 
objections to be made.”9 
Was I the only person left bewildered by this explanation?  “Com-
plex calculations?”  Counting to ten, while skipping weekends and 
holidays?  And yet, to demonstrate the complexity of it all, the Com-
mittee told us that the change from ten to fourteen will allow “a bit 
more time.”  A bit?  Were the days to be measured in drill sizes? 
And, of course, as any third grader who can both count and skip 
could have explained, the Committee was simply wrong.  Under for-
mer Rule 6(a)(2), a ten-day period was counted excluding weekends 
and holidays; a fourteen-day period was (and is) counted including 
weekends and holidays.  Since any given fourteen-day period includes 
four weekend days, under the former Rule, fourteen days would al-
most never be “a bit more”—not even a teeny, tiny bit more—than ten 
days excluding weekends.  (The rare exception would be for docu-
ments served on a weekend, a maneuver that should really be illegal 
altogether.)  And, of course, in some instances, if one or more holi-
days fell within a fourteen-day period, such a fourteen-day period 
would in fact be fewer calendar days than the old ten-day period. 
The 2009 Advisory Committee Note to the proposed change to 
Rule 6(a)—while still maintaining that old Rule 6(a) “made compu-
ting deadlines unnecessarily complicated”—did note that “a 10-day 
period and a 14-day period that started on the same day usually ended 
on the same day—and the 10-day period not infrequently ended later 
than the 14-day period.”10  Thus, to its credit, I suppose, the Commit-
tee finally figured out how Rule 6(a)(2) worked—albeit eighteen years 
later, and only in the context of explaining how difficult all of these 
complex calculations made the practice of law. 
II.  FUN WITH OLD RULE 6(A)(2) 
Old Rule 6(a)(2) had plenty of interesting applications, some bet-
ter known than others.  Here are a few of my favorites. 
 
Procedure 44-50 ( June 19, 1990) (recommending this change among others), in RE-
PORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE app. B (1990), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1990.pdf.  
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s note to the 1991 amendments. 
10 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) advisory committee’s note to the 2009 amendments. 
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A.  Rule 6(a)(2) and the Three Days of Mystery 
For a long time, one question the Rules themselves left unclear 
was how to combine Rule 6(a)(2) and Rule 6(e).11  Just prior to its 
amendment in 2005, Rule 6(e) provided: 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take 
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice 
or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served upon 
the party under Rule 5(b)(2)(B), (C), or (D), 3 days shall be added to 
the prescribed period.
12
 
Although the types of service that triggered the three-day exten-
sion varied from time to time, service by mail was always one of them. 
If the “prescribed period” were ten days, and three days were add-
ed pursuant to Rule 6(e), did that addition take the period outside of 
the purview of Rule 6(a)(2)?  Was it two separate periods (one of ten-
day length, the other of three), or one period of thirteen days? 
Of course, if it were the latter, that result would create an obvious 
anomaly.  The deadline for a paper served by mail would be earlier 
than the deadline for a paper served by hand:  ten days from the day 
the paper was served, but excluding weekends and holidays.  Indeed, 
since a paper served by mail (i.e., “snail mail”) is deemed “served” 
upon mailing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C), the 
recipient would have considerably less time to prepare and serve the 
required response.13  A number of courts, viewing this as an absurd re-
sult, concluded that the Rules could not be so interpreted.  That is, 
they said “very clever, but no dice” to the witty attorneys making such 
arguments, usually employing some colorful adjective to describe the 
result that the argument sought.14  As one court, after referring to the 
argument as “sophistry” (which it apparently meant as a pejorative), 
put it:  “That may make for a fun syllogism to toy with while we all tap 
 
11 Rule 6(e) was either renumbered or relettered as Rule 6(d) in 2007 as part of 
the comprehensive restyling of the Rules.  See Rosenthal Memorandum, supra note 1, 
at 26 (illustrating this change with a side-by-side chart).  Because most of the cases and 
authorities that I refer to were written before that change, I will refer to it as Rule 6(e).   
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 6(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (amended 
2005). 
13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(C).   
14 See, e.g., Lerro v. Quaker Oats Co., 84 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (“queer”); 
Tushner v. U.S. Dist. Court, 829 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1987) (“anomalous”); Coles 
Express v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 702 F. Supp. 355, 357 
(D. Me. 1988) (“perverse”). 
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dance on the head of this particular procedural pin, but it is not going 
to make the mail go any faster.”15 
But “sophistry” had its adherents.  Several courts insisted that the 
plain meaning of the Rule required that the period be considered one 
period of thirteen days.16  Indeed, each of the appellate court cases that 
considered the issue reversed the district court holdings, and district 
court rulings occasionally reversed the holdings of magistrate judges.17 
In 2005, the Committee purported to resolve this question by 
amending Rule 6(e).  It changed the phrase “3 days shall be added to 
the prescribed period” to “3 days are added after the prescribed pe-
riod would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).”18  Thus, the 
Committee purported to resolve the one-period-versus-two-periods 
question.19  “Two periods” won.  One must first calculate the initial pe-
riod pursuant to Rule 6(a) and then add three days. 
B.  Is Three Less than Eleven? 
Did Rule 6(a)(2) apply to the three-day add-on period itself be-
cause, after all, it was less than eleven days?  Prior to 2005, the slim 
weight of authority said “no.”  That view held that the three days were 
calendar days—that is, if the original period ended on a Friday, the 
 
15 Kurz v. Balboa Ins. Co., No. 88-6246, 1992 WL 22187, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 1992). 
16 See, e.g., THK Am., Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., 157 F.R.D. 651, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (read-
ing Rules 72(a), which then provided that a party could serve and file objections to a 
magistrate judge’s order “[w]ithin ten days after being served with a copy,” and Rule 
6(e) together to create a thirteen-day period); Pagan v. Bowen, 113 F.R.D. 667, 668 
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (“Rule 6(e) simply means that the three additional days allowed where 
service has been made by mail should be added to the original period and the total 
taken as the period for purposes of computation.”). 
17 See, e.g., Lerro, 84 F.3d at 242, 246 (affirming the district court’s decision but dis-
agreeing with its determination that the plaintiff’s objection was not timely); Tushner, 
829 F.2d at 855 (reversing the trial court’s method of time calculation); Mullins v. 
Hinkle, 953 F. Supp. 744, 748 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (reversing the magistrate judge’s de-
termination that certain objections were not timely). 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 6(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (amended 
2007); see also Memorandum from Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure 1 (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CVReport0504.pdf (recommending this change). 
19 See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1104/CV_excerpt0904.pdf (“The amendment 
makes clear that three days are added after the prescribed period otherwise expires.”). 
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extended period would go until Monday.20  But there were not a lot of 
cases considering the question, and there was at least one prominent 
disagreement with this trend under an analogous provision.21 
Further, a decent argument could be made for applying Rule 
6(a)(2) to the three days.  In 1996, the analogous add-three-days provi-
sion of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), Rule 26(c), 
was amended to add the word “calendar” before the word “days.”22  
The Advisory Committee notes stated that the change was made to cla-
rify that weekends and holidays should be included in the count.23  In 
an example of belt-and-suspenders rule amendment, FRAP 26 was 
amended again two years later so that the FRAP analog to 
FRCP 6(a)(2) (FRAP Rule 26(a)(2)) explicitly said that it did not apply 
when periods were stated in “calendar days.”24  Neither change was ever 
adopted for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although the same 
Standing Committee proposes rules to the Judicial Conference.25  By 
 
20 See, e.g., CNPq-Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Technologi-
co v. Inter-Trade, Inc., 50 F.3d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Rule 6(e) does 
not . . . establish a ‘period of time’ within the meaning of Rule 6(a). . . . [Thus w]hen 
the Rules provide for a period of less than eleven days, its run should be computed ex-
cluding weekends and holidays, pursuant to Rule 6(a), and the three-day extension—
counting weekends and holidays—should then be added at the end.”); Mullins, 953 F. 
Supp. at 747 n.6 (dictum) (“[W]eekends and holidays are excluded under Rule 6(a) 
from the 10-day calculation but not from the 3-day service addition under Rule 6(e).”); 
Vaquillas Ranch Co., Ltd. v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (dictum) (“This Court . . . will not exclude weekends and holidays 
from the computation of the three day mailing extension of Rule 6(e) . . . .”); Nat’l Sav-
ings Bank of Albany v. Jefferson Bank, 127 F.R.D. 218, 222 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (dicta) 
(“[I]t would be unreasonable to conclude that a party may exclude intermediate week-
ends and holidays when computing the separate 3-day mailing period.”). 
21 See Faggins v. Fischer, 853 A.2d 132, 139 (D.C. 2004) (per curiam) (“With all re-
spect to the federal contrary holdings [interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)], we deem our-
selves guided by the language and the spirit of the precedents interpreting our own 
rules.”).  The decision in Faggins should be lauded for its inclusion of calendar excerpts, 
so those who like to count along with the court can do so.  Id. at 135. 
22 See FED. R. APP. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 1996 amendment (“The 
amendment also states that the three day extension is three calendar days.”).     
23 Id. 
24 See FED. R. APP. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 1998 amendment (“Para-
graph (a)(2) includes language clarifying that whenever the rules establish a time pe-
riod in ‘calendar days,’ weekends and legal holidays are counted.”).  The revised lan-
guage reads, “Exclude intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays when the 
period is less than 7 days, unless stated in calendar days.”  FED. R. APP. P. 26(a)(2), 28 
U.S.C. app. r. 26(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (amended 2009).  
25 See James C. Duff, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, A Summary for the Bench 
and Bar, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (describing the 
Standing Committee and rulemaking process). 
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the interpretive maxim of expressio unius,26 the Committee must have 
intended to apply the opposite rule (i.e., counting only business days for 
the three-day extension) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.27 
Curiously, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2005 amendment 
to FRCP 6(e) suggested that the Committee believed that those 
amendments resolved this question.28  But there was no actual change 
in the language of the Rule itself that would affect how one viewed the 
question.29  The 2005 amendments certainly did not make obvious 
changes, like the amendments to FRAP 26 that were made in the 
1990s.  The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2005 Amendment, then, 
appear to be what the Committee’s critics have long decried:  making 
changes (or, at least, clarifications) in the Committee Notes, rather 
than in the Rules themselves.30  And, perhaps because the Committee 
hid it so well, courts and commentators didn’t really notice.31 
 
26 The term “expressio unius” is a “textual canon” of statutory interpretation suggest-
ing that the “expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others.”  WILLIAM N. ES-
KRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION app. B, at 19 (4th ed. 2007).  
27 In fairness to the Committee, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1996 
Amendment to FRAP 26 referred to the D.C. Circuit case, CNPq-Conselho Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Technologico v. Inter-Trade, Inc., 50 F.3d 56, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (per curiam), which held that the three-day extension in FRCP 6(e) was three 
calendar days and further stated the Committee’s belief that its result was correct.  FED. 
R. APP. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to the 1996 amendment.  But why, then, did 
the Committee propose a change only to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure?   
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to the 2005 amendment (“Three 
days are added after the prescribed period otherwise expires under Rule 6(a).  Inter-
mediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are included in counting these added 
three days.”). 
29 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting the change in language). 
30 See Wright, supra note 3, at 5 n.18 (arguing that the new trend of explaining and 
developing Rules in Advisory Committee Notes is “pernicious,” and in many cases the 
Notes “have made a point that the Rule itself does not make”). 
31 Thus, although the leading federal practice treatise had identified the issue prior 
to 2005, see 4B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1171 (3d ed. 2002), none of its post-2005 supplements made any mention 
of the 2005 Amendment or the Advisory Committee Notes as resolving the issue.  See also 
Long v. Astrue, No. 06-4195, 2007 WL 2407295, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2007) (not-
ing that it was “unclear” whether a ten-day window for response time provided by a local 
rule had expired because of “unclarity aris[ing] from the question of whether Rule 
6(e) . . . includes Saturdays and Sundays in its three-day window”); Am. Hardware Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. Reed Elsevier Inc., No. 03-9421, 2007 WL 1610455, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2007) 
(suggesting that Rule 6(e) might extend a period otherwise ending on September 28, 
2006, to October 3, 2006, because weekend days might not be counted). 
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C.  Backwards Counting:  Offer and Acceptance with Rule 6(a)(2) 
While the interplay of Rules 6(a)(2) and 6(e) was a great deal of 
fun and received considerable attention from lawyers and courts alike, 
the last application of Rule 6(a)(2) that I will discuss garnered much 
less notice:  the application to Rule 68 offers of judgment.  Prior to its 
2009 amendment, Rule 68 read as follows: 
 (a) MAKING AN OFFER:  JUDGMENT ON AN ACCEPTED OFFER.  More than 
10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may 
serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified 
terms, with the costs then accrued.  If, within 10 days after being served, 
the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party 
may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service.  
The clerk must then enter judgment. . . . 
 (c) OFFER AFTER LIABILITY IS DETERMINED.  When one party’s liability 
to another has been determined but the extent of liability remains to be 
determined by further proceedings, the party held liable may make an 
offer of judgment.  It must be served within a reasonable time—but at 
least 10 days—before a hearing to determine the extent of liability.
32
 
Both paragraphs (a) and (c) require something to be done before 
an event—the trial or the damages hearing—begins.  Those require-
ments raised the question whether the counting rules in Rule 6(a) ap-
plied to periods going backwards.  Most courts found that they did.33  If 
the conclusion were otherwise, papers due one or two days before a 
Monday hearing could have been served over the weekend and then 
filed with the court, and we know that that is not the correct answer. 
More interesting, though, was whether Rule 6(a)(2) should be 
applied to the period set forth in Rule 68(a):  “more than 10 days.”  
Could an offer of judgment be served ten-and-a-half days before a 
hearing, thus meeting the more-than-ten-days requirement of Rule 
68(a) but nonetheless requiring the application of Rule 6(a)(2)?  If 
that were possible, of course, then an offer of judgment under Rule 
68(a) would have to be served at least fourteen-and-a-half calendar 
days before the trial.  But the better view is surely that days can be 
 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 68, 28 U.S.C. app. r. 68(a), (c) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) 
(amended 2009). 
33 See, e.g., Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 
2001) (applying Rule 6(a)(2) to the requirement in Rule 56(c) that a summary judg-
ment motion be served at least ten days prior to the hearing); Varsity Gold, Inc. v. Big-
ham, No. 06-0509, 2007 WL 185089, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2007) (applying Rule 
6(a)(2) to a local rule requiring papers in opposition to a motion to be served three 
days before the noting date); Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., 130 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D. Md. 
1990) (applying Rule 6(a)(2) to a Rule 68 offer of judgment). 
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counted in only whole numbers.34  Accordingly, “more than ten days” 
was just another way of saying “eleven or more days,” and Rule 
6(a)(2) was entirely inapplicable.35  The offer need be served only 
eleven days before the hearing.  Further, the three added days of 
Rule 6(e) applied only to periods when a party “must or may act with-
in a prescribed period after service,”36 so one could serve the offer of 
judgment by mail without increasing the lead time before trial in 
which it had to be served. 
On the other hand, Rule 6(a)(2) should have applied to the time 
to make postliability offers under Rule 68(c), which is “at least 10 
days.”37  So, while the authors of the Rules may have thought they were 
requiring preliability offers to be made further in advance than post-
liability offers, the application of Rule 6(a)(2) meant that just the op-
posite was true. 
More importantly, both Rule 6(a)(2) and Rule 6(e) also surely 
applied to the period of time in which the offeree had to accept an of-
fer under Rule 68(a), which was “within 10 days after being served.”38  
Thus, while a Rule 68(a) offer could be made only eleven calendar 
days before the beginning of a trial, it could be accepted fourteen ca-
lendar days after it was made—more if not served by hand.  That is, 
acceptance could come right smack in the middle of the trial.39  Al-
though the Rule’s various references to a trial or hearing suggest that 
the offer-and-acceptance process was designed to be completed before 
trial, the Rule itself has no such explicit requirement.  Several courts 
 
34 See, e.g., Savino v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 378 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (N.Y. 1978) 
(“‘In the absence of an express limitation, the law does not take notice of a fraction of 
a day.’” (quoting Garelick v. Rosen, 8 N.E.2d 279, 280-81 (N.Y. 1937))). 
35 See McCabe v. Mais, No. 05-0073, 2009 WL 692293, at *7 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 16, 
2009) (dictum) (“[T]he period involved in Rule 68(a), ‘[m]ore than 10 days,’ logically 
cannot be a ‘period [. . .] less than 11 days.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
United States ex rel. Silva’s Excavation, Inc. v. Jim Cooley Constr., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 
1276, 1280 n.2 (D.N.M. 2008))), rev’d on other grounds, McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 6(e) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (amended 
2007) (emphasis added).   
37 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(c), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 68(c) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (amended 
2009) (emphasis added). 
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 68(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (amended 
2009) (emphasis added).  Rule 68(c), for some reason, has never set forth a time limit 
on when the offer can be accepted. 
39 See Craig Roecks, A Proposal to Clarify Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure 
Regarding Offers of Judgment, 7 NEV. L.J. 382, 404-05 (2007) (noting a similar issue with 
Nevada rules and proposing an amendment). 
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found this reading intolerable.40  They squirmed out of it by insisting 
that Rule 6(a)(2) was applicable to the deadline for making an offer.41  
But those courts never quite explained the feat of verbal or numerical 
legerdemain whereby a period of time “more than ten days” was ac-
tually a period of time “less than eleven days.” 
Under new Rule 68, effective December 1, 2009, both the prelia-
bility Rule 68(a) offer and the postliability Rule 68(c) offer must be 
made “[a]t least 14 days before” the date set for the trial or hearing.42  
Rule 68(a) further states that a Rule 68(a) offer can be accepted 
“within 14 days after being served.”43  Of course, this provision does 
not eliminate the possibility of a midtrial acceptance because the 
three-added-days rule (now Rule 6(d)) still applies only when a dead-
line is measured after service of a paper.44  Thus, even under the new 
Rule, an offer of judgment served by mail or electronically fourteen 
days prior to trial would be timely, as would an acceptance served se-
venteen days after service of the offer—on the fourth day of trial. 
III.  FAREWELL RULE 6(A)(2)—WE HARDLY KNEW YE 
I suspect that there is probably hidden potential for fun in new 
Rule 6.  The new Rule’s instruction on how to count hours particular-
ly intrigues me, especially the Advisory Committee’s example of a se-
venty-two-hour period that falls over the weekend in which daylight 
savings time ends.45  Given the examples in the last section, I do won-
 
40 See, e.g., Polk v. Montgomery Cnty., 130 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D. Md. 1990) (“[T]his pro-
vision [permitting the offeree a full ten days to respond] would be rendered meaning-
less if, because of the serving party’s failure to provide timely service of the offer, the 
case were to come on for trial before the expiration of the 10 day acceptance period.”). 
41 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., No. 86-0594, 1992 
WL 329489, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 1992) (finding that an offer of judgment served 
fourteen days before opening statements was untimely); Polk, 130 F.R.D. at 42 (noting 
that “[c]learly, the 10 day limitation prescribed under Rule 68 is covered by the exclu-
sion of intervening weekends and holidays” (emphasis added), and further stating that 
to award costs under Rule 68, “the Court would be compelled to disregard the plain 
statutory language of one clause of Rule 68”).  Needless to say, the Polk court never 
identified the clear and plain statutory language that compelled its conclusion. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a), (c). 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). 
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d) (“When a party may or must act within a specified time 
after service . . . 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 
6(a).” (emphasis added)). 
45 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to the 2009 amendment (“[F]or 
example, a 72-hour period that commences at 10:23 a.m. on Friday, November 2, 2007, 
will run until 9:23 a.m. on Monday, November 5; the discrepancy in start and end 
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der where this attention to detail has been hiding for the last twenty-
five years or so. 
Whatever the new Rule may have in store for us, it will never be 
old Rule 6(a)(2).  Old Rule 6(a)(2) had the potential for clever ar-
guments that few rules in our day and age provide.  Service by mail 
providing less time to respond than service by hand!  Offers of judg-
ment accepted after a week of trial, after you’ve realized that you’ve 
lost the jury entirely!  Modern practice rarely offers litigators the 
chance to make arguments like these with a straight face, not to men-
tion precedent and logic.  I, for one, will miss the old Rule. 
 
times in this example results from the intervening shift from daylight savings time to 
standard time.”).  
